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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has emerged as a major
instrument of social progress because of the Supreme Court decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power. I Few decisions in our time-perhaps only Brown
* Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Newark, N.J., B.A., J.D. Uni-
versity of Michigan. Professor Blumrosen served as first Chief of Conciliations for EEOC, 1965-
1967, as a consultant to the Departments of Justice, Labor, HUD, and EEOC from 1967-72, 77-79,
and as advisor to employers, unions, workers, state and local governments and Civil Rights organi-
zations. This paper is based on the Piper Lecture delivered at Chicago-Kent Law School on April 1,
1986. It benefitted from comments at the lecture by Irving M. King, Esq., Thomas R. Meites, Esq.,
Nina G. Stillman, Esq., and Michael A. Warner, Esq.; from comments at a Rutgers Law faculty
colloquium by Alan Axelrod, Philip Shuchman, John Leubsdorf, Annamy Sheppard, David Rice,
David Barrett, and, as always, from the insights of Ruth Blumrosen.
I. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Without Griggs, the statute might have warranted little more than a
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v. Board of Education2-have had such momentous social conse-
quences. 3 Between 1965 and 1983, nearly a million complaints of race,
sex, national origin and religious discrimination in employment were
filed with the EEOC, and more than 175,000 settlements favorable to
complainants were reached in the administrative process.4 Nearly 60,000
lawsuits were filed. 5 These figures-which show more of the iceberg than
usual--only begin to suggest the social effects generated by Title VII.
For example, in the year 1980, 2.3 million minority workers--one
quarter of the minority labor force-held better jobs than they would
have held if minorities were distributed among occupations as they had
been in 1965.6 The wage income going to minority workers in 1980 was
nearly 9 billion dollars more than would have been the case under the
occupational distribution of 1965. For women, the corresponding figures
for 1980 are 4 million in higher job categories and an increase in wage
income of 22 billion dollars as compared to the occupational distribution
of 1965. 7 The proportion of minorities and women in each major job
category in 1980 was closer to that of white males than in 1965.8 As a
result, the relative income of employed minorities and women is closer to
that of white males than it was in 1965.9 This article will first examine
the role of law in producing this transformation of the American work
force and then examine the application of Griggs to employment deci-
sions based on the subjective judgment of the employer-an issue which
has become central to equal employment law.
text note in labor law case books. The issue of intentional discrimination alone is scarcely worth a
law school course. One test of this thesis can be found in examining how labor law case books circa
1965 treated the state fair employment laws, and the then new federal statute. See, e.g., R. SMITH,
L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 951, 980,
1013 (4th ed. 1968); LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 281, 1004-16 (J. Williams 3d ed. 1965).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. On the difficulty of measuring the consequences of Supreme Court decisions, see Chopper,
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-12
(1984). See also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF
BLACK MEN IN AMERICA XXI (1986) ("Research in this area is complicated by the many forces,
both public and private, that have operated to improve the economic status of blacks.") [hereinafter
ECONOMIC PROGRESS]. See also Burstein & Monaghen, Equal Employment Opportunity and the
Mobilization of Law, 20 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 355 (1986) [hereinafter Mobilization].
4. See infra Appendix I.
5. Id.
6. See Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 6 INDUs. REL. L. J. 313, 336-37 (1984) [hereinafter Law Transmission System].
A recent economic analysis of the improvement in black male wages is J. SMITH & F. WELCH,
CLOSING THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR BLACKS (1986) [hereinafter
CLOSING THE GAP]. Overall, it confirms the view expressed in the text.
7. Law Transmission System, supra note 6, at 313, 338 n.67.
8. Id. at 337 n.66, 339 n.69.
9. See CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 70. See also ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 3.
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II. SOCIAL PROGRESS AND THE LAW
A. The Role of the Disparate Impact Principle
The "disparate impact" concept adopted in Griggs paved the way
for the massive improvement in the occupational position of minorities
and women described above. The Supreme Court held that educational
requirements and testing practices which screened out a higher propor-
tion of minorities than whites, and were not necessary for job perform-
ance, violated Title VII regardless of the employer's intent. If Title VII
had been construed to prohibit only "intentional discrimination," limited
education could be converted into a denial of employment, because an
employer could establish educational or testing requirements without any
intent to discriminate.' 0 The point embedded in Chief Justice Burger's
description of the unnecessary educational qualifications as "built in
headwinds for minority groups" t was driven home by Justice Powell in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, where he explained:
Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the educa-
tion and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond
their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious bur-
den on such citizens for the remainder of their lives. 12
Griggs has infused Title VII with extraordinary influence. 13  It caused
10. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 69-74 (1972) [hereinafter Strangers in Paradise].
CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, describes the racial impact of a high school diploma requirement in
1960. "It is easy to forget how little schooling the average black male worker had, even as late as
1960, and how large the black-white education differences were. .... Fully 80% of the 1960 black
male work force had not finished high school, and less than three percent had college degrees.... In
contrast, the majority of white workers in 1960... had completed high school and one in ten were
college graduates." CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 28-29.
There appeared little economic incentive at that time for blacks to continue their education.
"In 1940, attending school for another year raised black male wages by less than 4 percent-half the
amount for whites. Matters had improved little by 1950." CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 33.
11. 401 U.S. at 432.
12. 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
13. The literature on disparate impact theory is now substantial. See, e.g., Belton, Discrimina-
tion and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality After Weber, 59 N.C.L.
REV. 531 (1981); Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII Disparate Impact
Theory and The Bottom Line, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983); Lamber. Discretionary Decisionmaking:
The Application of Title VIl's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 869 [hereinafter Dis-
cretionary Decisionmaking]; Strangers in Paradise, supra note 10.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977), crystallized the distinction be-
tween "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment." The Supreme Court has never refined the
concept of "disparate impact." Some lower courts have mistakenly equated "disparate impact" with
the "two to three standard deviation" analysis. This is an error because the "standard deviation"
analysis is intended to identify intentional discrimination, not whether the practice had disparate
impact. Statistical significance is relevant to the issue of intentional discrimination because it negates
the possibility that the result being measured occurred by chance. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). This leaves open the likelihood that the result was intended; which may
ripen into a conclusion if the defendant fails to adduce evidence to the contrary. Other courts have
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employers to revise many of their practices so as to include minorities
and women and laid the foundation for affirmative action programs. 14
The improved minority and female opportunities described above
have significantly influenced some of the measures of group inequality
which have been used for forty years. These measures are relative occu-
pational distribution, relative wages and relative unemployment rate as
compared to whites or males.' 5 Partly as a result of the improved occu-
pational position described above, relative black-white male wages have
improved from 42% in 1965 to 69% in 1985. Those improvements con-
trast with the continuing high minority unemployment rate.1 6
In the early 1980's, the Reagan Administration claimed that most of
the improvement in job opportunities took place before the age of affirm-
ative action. 17 We have not heard much of that claim lately, thanks to
relied on the "80% rule" of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4D (1986), to identify disparate impact, but "the great majority... simply made a judgment
as to whether the difference was 'substantial' or 'significant' in a given case." B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 98-99 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW].
It has been suggested that a test of "statistical significance" should be used to define "disparate
impact," because the existing standards are either too vague or yield incorrect results. EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra, at 11, 12.
However, for the purposes of the disparate impact test, it does not matter if the result was
unintended. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. The fact that the restriction or exclusion of
minorities or women occurred by the chance workings of the industrial relations system does not
lessen the "built in headwinds" of that system. Therefore, the courts have properly rejected efforts
to limit the concept of disparate impact by reference to statistical significance.
14. See Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment after Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12-
14 (1981).
15. See A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW, 273-92 (1971).
16. ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 221. Saks, The Goals of the Civil Rights Movement
and the Evolution of the Economy, 37 RUTGERS L. REv./CIv. RTS. DEV. 765 (1985) considers the
improvement in part a "statistical mirage," because of higher drop out rates of minorities from the
labor force. Saks, supra, at 771.
17. See Special Analysis, J.P. J-15, Budget For Fiscal Year 1986 (citing Smith & Welch, Af-
firmative Action and Labor Markets, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 269 (1984)). Smith and Welch contend that
the proportion of minorities and women as officials and managers increased more rapidly between
1967 and 1974, leveled off in 1974, and did not increase thereafter, despite the increase in enforce-
ment programs after 1974. However, the Goals and Timetable Program was in place in 1971. Fur-
thermore, Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action in Employment, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 439 (1984)
describes in detail the relative gains of minorities and women after 1974. His research suggests that
the greater gains were made in employment with governmental contractors covered by E.O. 11246.
CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 85-100, confirms this conclusion.
T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 133, 134 (1984), argues that "the eco-
nomic rise of minorities preceded passage of the Civil Rights Act by many years." This is incorrect
with respect to employment as shown by the evidence of improvement after the 1960's cited infra
note 18. He also argues that "the disadvantaged . . . are precisely the people who have fallen further
behind under Affirmative Action auspices." This point confuses Equal Employment Opportunity
programs with poverty programs. The thrust of Title VII is to protect all members of protected
groups against subordination based on group membership, not only the poor. Title VII never sought
to aid the "unqualified." Many members of protected groups have accomplished much in the face of
discriminatory conditions. They might have accomplished much more if they had been free to func-
tion in a non-discriminatory setting. Their success, however, does not mean that discrimination was
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the works of Hammerman, Leonard and Jones.' 8 This body of work es-
tablishes that much of the improvement in minority and female opportu-
nities took place throughout the entire period of the seventies, during the
time when affirmative action was institutionalized under Title VII and
Executive Order 11246.
Employers with 15 or more employees are covered by Title VII
which is enforceable by private or government suit in federal court.
Under Title VII, courts may require affirmative action in some circum-
stances, and it is permitted in additional circumstances.' 9 In addition,
government contractors are required by Executive Order 11246 to take
affirmative action in some circumstances. 20 Recent studies suggest that,
since 1970, government contractors with affirmative action programs
under Executive Order 11246 have done "better" in providing Equal
Employment opportunity than non-contractors. 21 This is a welcome
change from the 1960's, when large government contractors hired fewer
minority white collar employees than their non-contractor counter-
parts.22 This improvement by government contractors resulted from reg-
ulations issued by the Labor Department under Executive Order 11246.
These regulations required a contractor who has "underutilized" minori-
ties and women to take affirmative action, including specific goals and
timetables, to increase participation of those groups.23 This approach
absent. Their further advance does benefit themselves, the group and the society at large which
thereby draw nearer to when it will be unnecessary to provide legal protection to the group. See
Blumrosen, Some Thoughts on Affirmative Action Here and In India: Galanter's Competing Equali-
ties, A. B. FOUND. RES. J. 653, 660-61 (1985).
A preliminary draft of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report, ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra
note 3, included the claim that more progress was made before 1960 than after but this claim was
omitted from the final version.
18. HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPORTUNITY (1984); Jones, The Genesis and Present
Status of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 901 (1985) [hereinafter Genesis]; Leonard, supra note 17; see also Law Transmission System,
supra note 6.
19. Affirmative Action is a permissible judicial remedy expressly provided in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(g); see Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). Voluntary affirmative action is permitted pursuant to United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and EEOC Guidelines on Affirmative Action, 29 C.F.R. § 1608
(1986).
20. Affirmative Action is required, in some circumstances, as a condition for obtaining govern-
ment contracts by Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e) (1982).
21. See Leonard, supra note 17; CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 85-100; ECONOMIC PRO-
GRESS, supra note 3, at 230-35.
22. In the 1960's, many large contractors joined "Plans for Progress," an association devoted to
increasing minority employment. An EEOC study of white collar employment in the New York
headquarters of these companies established that they had fewer minorities than the headquarters
offices of non-PFP organizations. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, HEAR-
INGS ON DISCRIMINATION IN WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYMENT 614-16 (1968).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (1986). See Genesis, supra note 18.
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produced the "turnaround" of government contractors. 24
In light of the government's hesitancy to enforce the Executive Or-
der by debarring a contractor from doing business with it,25 I believe that
contractors have responded positively to these regulations in part be-
cause of the influence of the Griggs principle. The Executive Order was
not seriously enforced before Title VII was enacted and interpreted, even
though similar orders had existed since 1941.26 Neither the prohibitions
on employment discrimination in state laws since 1945 or the Supreme
Court proscription of discrimination in collective bargaining in 1944 pro-
duced significant results.27 Congress and the Griggs decision provided
legitimacy and acceptability for the equal employment opportunity pro-
gram. 28 The Labor Department usually went "to the mat" only with a
contractor whose practices violated both the Executive Order and Title
VII.29 An employer who challenged the applicability of the Executive
Order would still face liability under the Griggs principle. Under these
circumstances, opposing the Order was scarcely worth the effort. In this
way, the Griggs principle supported the Executive Order Program.
Finally, Griggs provides the underlying justification for race con-
scious affirmative action programs under Title VII. Identification of
"disparate impact" requires that employers be race conscious. Once dis-
parate impact is identified, voluntary action to ameliorate it is necessary
to avoid liability in the absence of business necessity. Affirmative person-
nel actions taken to comply with Griggs could not be held to violate the
statutory restrictions on preferential treatment in Title VII.30 These af-
24. Leonard, supra note 17.
25. For an illustration of this hesitancy, see Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc. 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
26. See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ch.
5 (1966) [hereinafter LEGAL RESTRAINTS].
27. Id. at ch. 3 (State Laws) and ch. 6 (Duty of Fair Representation).
28. See Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379 for a
discussion of the pitfalls in the use of the concept of legitimacy. The empirical evidence of the
change of national behavior after the passage of the Civil Rights Act stands in such sharp contrast to
the minute movements in the pre-1964 period as to warrant the conclusion in the text. P. BURSTEIN,
DISCRIMINATION, JOaS AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985) [hereinafter POLITICS]. In chapter 3, the
author concludes that Congress acted in 1964 when public opinion was at its height in support of
civil rights. Id. at 67.
29. There is a close relationship between "underutilization" as used in the regulations under
E.O. 11246 and "disparate impact" as used in Title VII. When the government did seek to enforce
the Executive Order in circumstances where Congress specified that there was no violation of Title
VII, it lost. See United States v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 564 F.2d 179 (1977).
30. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Blumrosen, supra note 14;
see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); Local 28,
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); EEOC Guidelines on Affirmative Action, 29
C.F.R. § 1608 (1986).
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firmative actions generated by Griggs account for much of the improve-
ment in minority and female opportunity described above.
B. Economic Forces or the Force of Law
The argument that forces other than the law are responsible for the
changes which have taken place in the composition of the workforce is
frequently made by those who disapprove of government intervention in
the economic system. 31 Some economists insist that economic forces ex-
plain the improved position of minorities and women in employment,
and that the law is either of marginal influence, or is positively harmful. 32
Smith and Welch 33 conclude that Title VII, E.O. 11246 and affirmative
action did have a positive influence on black employment and wages.
However, they state that this effect had "marginally altered black male
wage gains."'34 They base this conclusion on a detailed study of black
male employment patterns from 1940-1980. In that period, they con-
clude, the "long range historical forces . . .- education and migration-
were the primary determination of long term black economic
improvement. '35
However, their analysis does not acknowledge that the increase in
labor demand and decrease in supply along with wage controls of World
War II accounted for much of the improvement in black male wages
from 1940 to 1950. Wage controls decreased the black/white male wage
differential in three ways: (1) increases were in cents per hour rather
than percentages which reduced the percentage differential; (2) it was
easier to raise low or substandard wages; and (3) there was an anti-
discrimination component of the wage control program as well as an Ex-
ecutive Order prohibiting discrimination in defense employment.3 6 In
effect, wage controls restricted white male wages more rigorously than
minority or female wages. If the 1940-50 period is omitted from the
Smith and Welch analysis, their own calculations make the accomplish-
ments of the affirmative action era appear most impressive. Eighty-five
percent of the improvement in black/white male wage ratio between
31. See sources cited supra note 17.
32. T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984); CLOSING THE GAP, supra
note 6.
33. CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 85-100.
34. Id. at 99.
35. Id.
36. See 1 TERMINATION REPORT, NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 150-55, 177-200, 664-66
(1946). See R. WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR 14-15, 241 (1969). See LEGAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 26,
at ch. 5, for a history of the Executive Order program.
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1950 and 1980 which they report occurred after 1960. 37
Smith and Welch conclude that the historical black-white wage gap
in the South was prominent until 1970, and then it narrowed "very
sharply" between 1970 and 1980.38 They attribute this change to the
probability that "racial discrimination is waning in the South."' 39 This
"waning of racial discrimination" was certainly related to the Civil
Rights Laws.
Further, they note that the wage disparities between comparably ed-
ucated blacks and whites tended to be life-long.4° The opening of better
paying "white jobs" to blacks was a crucial enforcement strategy and a
central concern of Executive Orders and Title VII from 1965 to the pres-
ent.41 To the extent this strategy has worked, the Smith and Welch study
suggests it had long term advantageous consequences.
Finally, Smith and Welch emphasize that one long term force at
work in reducing the black-white male wage gap was improved schooling
for blacks. This factor in their view largely explains the decline in black-
white wage differences, including those of the 1970's, when for the first
time, wage benefits from additional schooling were greater for blacks
than whites. They do not attribute this development to the law because
"more than half the narrowing of the gap in income benefits from addi-
tional schooling took place before 1960. ' ' 42 However, as previously
noted, when the factors which account for the 1940-1960 gain are ex-
amined, they turn out to include World War II wage controls. Further-
more the improved schooling in the South may well have been influenced
by the line of Supreme Court opinions which culminated in Brown v.
Board of Education.43 Thus, the lynchpin of their argument that "educa-
tion" and not "Civil Rights" was the primary social cause of improved
black-white male wage differentials disintegrates.
The United States Civil Rights Commission issued a report in 1986
which confirms that affirmative action programs are essential to the con-
37. CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 14, describes in Table 6 the percentage improvement in
Black-White male ratios of weekly wages between 1940 and 1980. It states that more than half of
that change occurred between 1940 and 1960, prior to the era of affirmative action. However, the
war decade of 1940-50 accounted for 47% of the change, 1950-60 for 8% and the 1960-80 period for
45%. If the war decade is omitted, change from 1950-1980 included 15% from 1950-60, and 85%
from 1960-80, the era of affirmative action. The 1986 Civil Rights Commission Report suggests that
during the 1950's, black-white male wage relationships did not improve at all. ECONOMIC PRO-
GRESS, supra note 3, at 16-18.
38. CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 56.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 39.
41. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
42. CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 41.
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tinued narrowing of the black-white male wage gap.44 The Report notes
that this gap narrowed in three of the four decades between 1940 and
1980. Only during the 1950's did the gap remain stagnant.45 The fifties
was the only decade without meaningful federal equal employment op-
portunity programs. In the three decades with such programs, the black-
white wage gap narrowed. This suggests that the federal programs were
a necessary element in the improvement of relative black-white wages.
The Commission concluded that research methodology was not able to
establish the effect of civil rights programs on employment. 46 Therefore,
this research methodology cannot rebut the inference that government
programs are essential to continued progress in minority and female
employment.
C. The Law Transmission System
To understand the impact of the law, it is helpful to conceive the
process by which a legal norm is transmuted into conforming behavior as
a "law transmission system."'4 7 The "law transmission system" is "that
set of legislative, administrative and judicial actions which interact with
regulated institutions, beneficiary organizations and individuals to
achieve a real world response to a legislative standard. '48 Viewing the
law in this way requires consideration of both objective statistics of legal
activity and a wide range of low visibility activity which cannot be quan-
tified. We can identify complaint processing activity of agencies, agency
budgets, and number of lawsuits. 49 The volume of reported federal court
44. ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 3.
45. Id. at 16-18.
46. Id. at 238-41. The Commission report purports to explain a significant part of the continu-
ing wage gap as based on the greater involvement with crime among younger black males, and a
greater propensity to rely on disability and retirement benefits among older black males. The greater
propensity to invoke disability benefits among older blacks may be directly tied to discrimination
which steered them into blue collar jobs with higher risks of physical injury. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SELECTED HEALTH CHARACTERIS-
TICS BY OCCUPATION 34 (1980). Since many of these jobs were lower paying jobs, the prospect of
disability insurance benefits may have been more inviting than would otherwise have been the case.
The Commission report recognizes this possibility, yet explains the "wage gap" in part by reference
to the use of disability benefits without noting the relationship of disability to discrimination. See
ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 3, at 56-70. Whether the explanation of criminal behavior ac-
counting for lower labor market participation of younger blacks is valid lies beyond the scope of this
paper.
The Commission fails to note that the G.I. Bill for returning World War II Veterans probably
exacerbated educational differences between blacks and whites, because the proportion of blacks
eligible for college benefits was necessarily much smaller than the proportion of whites. See CLOS-
ING THE GAP, supra note 6.
47. See Law Transmission System, supra note 6.
48. Id. at 314. From a sociological perspective, the law transmission system is a process for
mobilization. See Mobilization, supra note 3.
49. See infra Appendix I; Smith & Welch, supra note 17; Mobilization, supra note 3.
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decisions under Title VII is substantial. 50
But the law influenced employment decisions in more subtle and less
easily measured ways. The emergence of EEO specialists in larger corpo-
rations, encouraged and required by regulations under E.O. 11246,5 1 has
meant that in many situations, EEO policies have been implemented
without direct government intervention. The expansion of law school
courses, seminars and conferences on EEO matters attest to the degree
that EEO policies have become imbedded in employers' industrial rela-
tions policies. The outpouring of law review articles and the publication
of a most useful case-text book by Schlei & Grossman titled EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 52 brought developments home to the legal
community, as did the emergence of specialized case reporting services. 53
Once the Civil Rights Act was in place, most personnel decisions
involving minorities and women were affected by its presence. By the
50. See Culp, A New Employment Policy for the 1980s: Learning From the Victories and Defeats
of Twenty Years of Title VII, 37 RUTGERS L. REV./Civ. RTs. DEV. 895, 899 (1985); Mobilization,
supra note 3, at 361. A study of how the industrial relations process responded to the substance of
these decisions is found in Law Transmission System, supra note 6.
51. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.22 (1986).
52. Supra note 13.
53. Bureau of National Affairs Fair Employment Practice cases introduced in 1969 is now up
to volume 40. Three volumes of nearly 2000 pages are published every year.
One barometer of the concern for EEO matters in the industrial relations community is the
extent of references to these matters in the Labor Relations Yearbook, published annually since 1965
by the Bureau of National Affairs. The Yearbook summarizes conferences, speeches and govern-
ment developments in labor relations generally. An analysis of these annual volumes shows an
increasing emphasis on EEO matters from 1965 to 1984.
% of pages on
Total which EEO items References to Griggs in
Year EEO items appeared Labor Rel. Year Book
65 56 20 -
66 74 18 -
67 50 10 -
68 18 4 -
69 42 6 -
70 76 20 -
71 11 3 2
72 23 8 2
73 31 13 1
74 54 14 5
75 74 17 7
76 114 26 6
77 75 20 9
78 107 32 10
79 88 22 2
80 107 30 2
81 136 36 9
82 107 44 4
83 102 36 1
84 114 28 -
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early 1970's it was difficult for any of the participants in a personnel
decision involving a female or minority to be oblivious of the candidate's
race or sex. Advice from corporate counsel, personnel and EEO officers
of corporations, and outside attorneys influenced decisions which were
never subjected to formal proceedings. 54 Thus the existence of the law-
as interpreted in Griggs-exerted a major influence on personnel deci-
sions. When one understands how the legal system has interacted with
the industrial relations system, the assumptions that the role of law can
be isolated from other "economic" or "social factors" become untenable.
It is virtually impossible to isolate particular components or programs,
because their pressures are interdependent and their influence is
cumulative. 55
Assessment of the influence of the law is further complicated by the
political reality that the statute could not have been adopted in the first
average % of pages 1965-1969 = 11.6
with EEO references 1970-1974 = 11.6
1975-1979 = 23.4
1980-1984 = 34.8
Another indicator of the significance of Griggs is the number of cases in which it has been
cited by the federal courts.
Supreme Courts of District
Court Appeal Courts Total
1972 3 32 50 85
1973 4 31 64 95
1974 8 41 56 105
1975 2 68 75 145
1976 5 36 87 128
1977 5 49 101 155
1978 4 39 85 128
1979 5 22 92 129
1980 3 65 98 166
1981 1 63 64 128
1982 5 51 57 113
1983 2 39 50 91
1984 2 40 38 80
1985 - 42 27 69
It is difficult to assess the significance of this pattern of citations because there are few analyses of the
"quantitative" importance of court decisions. Shuchman & Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the
Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of"No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L. J. 195, 213 (1980),
suggest that the "half life" of a reported court of appeals opinion is seven years. Shuchman and
Gelfand's statistics were based on citations to opinions published only if at least one member of the
three judge panel believed that it would have precedential value. The mean number of citations to
each such opinion within four years after publication was 5.2. Id. at 217. If this analysis is applica-
ble to the Supreme Court opinions, then Griggs is still leading a healthy existence.
54. Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981) involved a fairly typical
form of informal affirmative action. The Seventh Circuit, erroneously in my view, held it illegal. See
Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment After Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 28-29, 32
(1981), and infra text accompanying notes 183-90.
55. Chopper, supra note 3; EcONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 3.
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instance, unless a significant part of the society was "ready" to comply
with equal opportunity standards. 56 This social readiness to accept a new
behavioral norm arose from a melange of moral, emotional, political and
economic judgments. Its existence does not detract from the significance
of the statute in influencing subsequent behavior. Rather, it may help
explain the extent of compliance with the norm once it has been "estab-
lished" as national policy. 57
This description of the process by which the principles of the law
were incorporated into industrial relations systems makes it impossible to
isolate the law from other factors involved in personnel decisionmak-
ing.58 It suggests that the law did have a major impact on the pattern of
personnel decisions of significant employers, and properly places the bur-
den of persuasion to the contrary on those who would dispute the point.
D. A Judgment of Effectiveness
Assessing the effect of the law requires a standard against which to
measure its accomplishments. This is difficult to develop. 59 There prob-
ably was no detailed consensus in 1964 as to exactly what the law should
accomplish. Two of the three social indicators of discrimination-occu-
pational distribution and wage disparities-have improved since 1965,
while the third indicator-the unemployment rate-has not. 60 The high
minority birth rate in the 1950's and 1960's provides a partial explana-
tion for the continued high relative unemployment rate, along with infer-
ior educational preparation. 61 The shift of jobs from the city to the
56. POLITICS, supra note 28.
57. A widely circulated booklet describing developments in EEO law and policy published by
the Conference Board was R. SCHAEFFER, NON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES, 1963-1972 (1973). In the Introduction, Alexander B. Trowbridge, President of the
Conference Board, stated at 111:
Business organizations found that, as a matter of law (Title VII) they were required not
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age in any aspect of
the employment relationship. But the nature of that obligation was by no means obvious.
It is only during the past year that leading companies have reported that the central
thrust of the court decisions dealing with nondiscrimination has become sufficiently clear
to serve them as a reliable guide to action. Once again, it was a Supreme Court decision, in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., that set the basic course. Id. at 111.
58. The optimum method of achieving compliance with a regulatory standard is for the regu-
lated community to absorb the standard as part of its regular process. See Blumrosen, Six Condi-
tions for Meaningful Self Regulation, 69 A.B.A. J. 1264 (1983).
59. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973). See POLI-
TICS, supra note 28, at ch. 7.
60. The "improvement" in occupational distribution is significant when measured against
either past performance, or a realistic estimate of the possible. POLITICS, supra note 28, ch. 7. The
improvement in wage disparities is not as visible because of the increasing minority unemployment
rate.
61. See CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6; ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 3.
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suburbs which are still largely white has contributed to the problem. Fi-
nally, the EEO laws have probably had less impact on smaller employers
who provide many entry level jobs.62 Nevertheless, overall minority em-
ployment had increased about a million beyond that which it would have
been under 1965 distribution.
The remaining wage differential between both minorities and wo-
men and white males may still be influenced by Title VII. Women and
minorities have only recently entered the higher paying job classifica-
tions. Within these classifications, time brings increased rewards. Thus,
the wage gap will begin to narrow as time passes. 63 In addition, the law
of wage discrimination lags behind other aspects of Title VII law. This is
due largely to the slow start that the EEOC made in recognizing sex
discrimination as a major element in Title VII. As a consequence, the
law of wage discrimination is about five years behind where it would
have been if the EEOC had been vigilant concerning sex discrimination
matters in the sixties. When the law of wage discrimination matures, it
will help to address the minority/female wage differential as compared to
white males. 64
The progress in connection with occupational distribution and rela-
tive wages has been substantial. 65 However, minorities and women are
far from equal to white males in occupational distribution and relative
earnings. But the framers of the Civil Rights Act, while they did expect
that there would be substantive, not merely procedural, improvement in
the relative position of minorities and women, did not adopt group equal-
ity as its objective, nor did they set a timetable for the substantive
achievement they expected. 66 Improvement has come far more rapidly
under the Act than before it, and the remaining disparities do not seem
insurmountable. My view is that heretofore respectable progress should
continue until the remaining group disparities are no longer fairly attrib-
utable to discrimination. This point is not easy to identify, but we might
62. See Leonard, supra note 17, who concludes that employers who are not government con-
tractors have not done as well as government contractors in hiring minorities. This group would
include many "small" employers. CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 85-100. It has been estimated
that more than half the job growth in 1986 will be with employers of fewer than 100 employees.
Daily Labor Report, Mar. 26, 1986, at A.4.
63. CLOSING THE GAP, supra note 6, at 18-20, notes that a significant proportion of black males
have "made it" into the middle class. POLITICS, supra note 28, at ch. 7, discusses the effect of
passage of time.
64. See Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986); R. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job
Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979).
65. On measuring "substantiality" see Blumrosen, Quotas Common Sense and Law in Labor
Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1974); POLITICS,
supra note 28, at ch. 7.
66. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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take the "rule of thumb" of the UGESP of an 80% ratio as a general
guide.67 This suggests that current EEO strategies, including affirmative
action, should continue. The existing disparities do not justify abolition
of the programs.
The EEO strategy followed since 1965 is not likely to provide
enough jobs to meet the needs of a rapidly increasing, young and poorly
educated minority labor force. The increased unemployment rate of mi-
norities attests to this point. Job creation should be explored in conjunc-
tion with the EEO enforcement program. A relatively simple method of
creating some 5 million jobs, many of them part-time, would be to reduce
"normal" work weeks under the Fair Labor Standards Act to 32 hours.68
This approach would be effective in enhancing minority and female op-
portunities if coupled with continued enforcement of EEO law.
E. The Legitimacy of Griggs
Was the "disparate impact" concept properly read into Title VII?
The statute can be read either as requiring "intent" or as prohibiting
practices with "adverse effect."'69 The standard definition of discrimina-
tion in the legislative debate, a "distinction in treatment given to different
individuals because of their different race" 70 did not address the question
of whether the difference had to be intended. The "impact" concept was
consistent with the Congressional purpose to "lift the Negro from the
status of inequality to one of equality of treatment. '71
While Congress was not specifically aware of the disparate impact
principle in 1964, it did intend to eradicate "all forms of discrimina-
67. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures-1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.18
(1986), establish Federal standards to implement the Griggs principle. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1986)
provides that a selection rate of minorities or women which is less than 80% of the selection rate for
white males will be assumed to have disparate impact.
68. Blumrosen & Culp, Reducing the Workweek to Expand Employment: A Survey of Indus-
trial Response, 9 EMPL. REL. L. J. 393 (1984).
69. Compare Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay On the Theory, Problems and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition Of Employment Discrimination and A Recommendation For Reform, 7 INDUS.
REL. L. J. 429 (1985) with Blumrosen, Griggs was Correctly Decided. A Response To Gold, 8 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 443 (1986); Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intention in 1972, A
Response To Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105 (1986); Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of
Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 939 (1985); Blumrosen, Strangers in Para-
dise, supra note 10.
70. 110 CONG. REC. 5423 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
71. Senator Muskie in support of the bill, 110 CONG. REC. 14328 (1964). Curiously, the state-
ment was relied on by Justice Rehnquist in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
251 (1979), as demonstrating opposition to affirmative action. I think it suggests a positive view
toward the concept. See Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination, and
Legislative In tent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983) [hereinafter
Group Interest].
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tion '"72 and it rejected efforts to narrow the definition of discrimination. 73
To implement the Act, it created an agency which had to interpret the
statute in order to engage in investigation and conciliation. It is conven-
tional law that the interpretations of the agency are to be given deference
by the courts if they are "permissible," or "reasonable" interpretations of
the statute.74 In Griggs, the government argued for a "disparate impact"
interpretation, and for a "job relatedness" requirement with respect to
testing. The Court accepted the government's argument, fully aware that
the agencies had conciously adopted a "broad" interpretation of the stat-
ute.75 Thus, it appears that Griggs was correctly decided under the 1964
Act.
In any event, the concept was understood by the time of the 1972
amendments, as committee reports in both houses demonstrate. 76 The
72. See, e.g., Hishon v. King, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
73. Both Houses rejected efforts to limit Title VII to acts which were based "solely" on race,
etc. See A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 172-76 (1971). See also Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 286-87 (opinion of Powell, J.), and 337-40 (opinion of
Brennan, J.) (1978).
74. Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Chenery v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 322 U.S. 194 (1947).
75. See Strangers in Paradise, supra note 10, at 110. This same analysis was applied to the
government's interpretation of religious discrimination in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 n.11 (1977).
76. See Thomson, supra note 69.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971):
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distinguishable
events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual or
organization.... Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex
and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the prob-
lem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs. The litera-
ture on the subject is replete with discussions of the mechanics of seniority and lines of
progression, perpetuation of the present effects of earlier discriminatory practices through
various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements. The forms and inci-
dents of discrimination which the Commission is required to treat are increasingly com-
plex. Particularly to the untrained observer, their discriminatory nature may not appear
obvious at first glance. A recent striking example was provided by the U.S. Supreme Court
in its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . where the Court held that the use of
employment tests as determinants of an applicant's job qualification, even when nondis-
criminatory and applied in good faith by the employer, was in violation of Title VII if such
tests work a discriminatory effect in hiring patterns and there is no showing of an overrid-
ing business necessity for the use of such criteria.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971):
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distin-
guishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual
or organization .... Experience has shown this view to be false. Employment discrimina-
tion as viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar
with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects"
rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject is replete with
discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetua-
tion of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory practices through various institutional
devices, and testing and validation requirements ....
See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS
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extension of Griggs to sex discrimination in 197777 was consistent with
the Court's view of the original Act, and with the 1972 legislative history.
The legislative history of Title VII is murky on many questions. 78
The legislators who were addressing the general social problems of dis-
crimination did not have before them the specific issues which were iden-
tified only when the statute was applied to actual cases. Nonetheless, two
points emerge clearly from the debates.
First, Congress was intent on securing visible and measurable im-
provement in employment of minorities and women. Both the 1964 and
1972 Committee Reports describe their inferior position in the employ-
ment system and state that progress had been "too slow."'79 These state-
ments make clear that the legislators were concerned with substantive
improvement, as well as with procedural fairness. Those comments pro-
vide support for the "consequences" concept of Griggs.
Secondly, Congress did not want jobs to be allocated mechanically
to members of various groups by reference to population or labor force.
The debates about "quotas" as well as the language of the "no preferen-
tial treatment" provision and the references in the debate to the desirabil-
ity of "color blind" personnel decisions establish this point. 80
These two principles press in different directions with respect to the
definition of illegal activity and the scope of affirmative action. The in-
terplay between these principles was left to the agencies and the courts.8 '
By 1972, the courts had developed the disparate impact principle and the
agencies had developed "good faith efforts to meet goals and timetables"
to address these points. Congress, in 1972, confirmed the Griggs deci-
L. REV. 465 (1968). Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A Gen-
eral Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969); Devel-
opments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). See also M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966), and decisions in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); United States v. Local 189, United Paper-
makers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968) and cases cited therein.
77. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
78. One primary reason for the inconclusive quality of the legislative deliberations was the lack
of legal terminology to discuss group interests. See Group Interest, supra note 71. On the difficulty
of articulating group concerns in an individualistic society, see R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W.M.
SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER & S.M. ToPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART, INDIVIDUALISM & COMMITr-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 206 (1986); UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 81-82 (1976).
79. See H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 76, at 4-5; S. REP. No. 415, supra note 76, at 415-16 for
discussion prior to the adoption of the 1972 Act. See also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 18 (1963). This was the only committee report on the 1964 Act.
80. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
81. This is a common legislative practice. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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sion 8 2 and refused to overturn the goals and timetables approach which
had been adopted by the Labor Department.8 3 These actions strongly
suggest that both the broad definition of discrimination and the liberal
scope for affirmative action are mandated by the Act,84 or are at least
clearly "permissible. '8 5 Nevertheless, the principle has been challenged
in recent years with respect to its application to the single most critical
aspect of employment decisionmaking-the employer's subjective judg-
ment. The remainder of this article will explore that issue.
III. SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS AND GRIGGS
During the industrial upheaval of the last ten years, the Griggs prin-
ciple has increasingly been brought to bear on employment decisions
based on "subjective judgment," rather than on objective criteria, such as
scored tests, diploma requirements, and objective physical requirements.
Personnel actions based on "subjective judgments" such as those involv-
ing "aggressiveness," "leadership ability," "capacity for handling unfore-
seen situations," and "ability to handle interpersonal relationships" have
become increasingly important in the last decade. Employment discrimi-
nation law will be more heavily involved in these matters in the next
decade. Several factors contribute to this development.
(1) Griggs may have contributed to the increasing use of subjective
judgments in personnel decisions. In order to avoid "disparate impact,"
some employers may have abandoned the use of scored tests and moved
to a subjective selection process. Others may have combined the results
of "objective" criteria with "subjective" judgments in order to avoid ad-
verse impact by including minorities and women in jobs from which they
would otherwise have been excluded. This approach is recognized as an
alternative to validation in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures and protected under the Affirmative Action
Guidelines.8 6
(2) The older theory of "scientific management" that jobs should
be narrowly defined to encourage repetitive performance of limited func-
82. See supra note 76.
83. See Helfand & Pemberton, supra note 69; Group Interests, supra note 71.
84. Helfand & Pemberton, supra note 69.
85. See NLRB v. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
86. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6 (1986);
Affirmative Action Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(c)(1) (1986). For a discussion of the develop-
ment of these guidelines, see Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines: Ad-
ministering a Polycentric Problem, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 323 (1983) [hereinafter Bottom Line]. The
utility of the approach described in the text may have been limited by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982).
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tions, is giving way. Management now seeks flexibility in task assign-
ment, which requires a broader definition of the totality of the "job."
The broader the job description, the more likely it will encompass mat-
ters for which subjective judgments are brought to bear in selection.
(3) The shift from smoke stack to service industries and from blue
collar to white collar work expands the proportion of jobs for which in-
terpersonal skills and intangible abilities are critical. Selection for jobs
which are believed to require these skills and abilities is commonly based
on a "subjective judgment" of the likelihood that the candidate will have
these capabilities. This process does not only apply to "high level" jobs.
The fast food store manager may make less than a steelworker, but the
job may require a wider range of interpersonal and managerial skills.
(4) Almost all of the jobs in the upper tier of job categories require
the incumbent to engage in decisionmaking under conditions of uncer-
tainty. The selection of persons with this ability involves an estimate of
likely performance under unknown conditions. These estimates are usu-
ally "subjective," reflecting the best guess of the decisionmaker.8 7 This is
true of officials, managers, professional and technical positions-most of
the "better jobs" in terms of money and status.
(5) The wave of reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions, cou-
pled with the enhanced quest for short term results has placed increased
pressures on managers at all levels. These managers in turn are likely to
pay closer attention to the quality of performance of persons they select.
In situations where there are no "objective" criteria by which success can
be predicted, and the pressures to produce are strong, managers are
likely to fall back on a deep-rooted assumption that those whose back-
groundG are similar to their own or familiar to them are likely to do a
better job than those whose background and experience are different58
87. Discretionary Decisionmaking, supra note 13, concludes that this characteristic of the job is
so crucial as to warrant judicial deference to the employers' "subjective decision" when the job
actually requires discretion and the employer actually exercised it. Burstein and Monaghan note
that 45% of Title VII cases with reported opinions involved upper level or supervisory jobs. Mobili-
zation, supra note 3, at 369.
88. The fact that this is irrational is beside the point. The law school that I attended 35 years
ago bears little resemblance to the law school of today; most of my professors are long dead or
retired. Nevertheless, when I meet a recent Michigan Law School graduate, I assume initially that
the legal education he or she received must have been similar to mine. It is difficult to shake free of
this initial perception.
The underlying error, of course, is to assume that the "legal education" which I received was
"the same" as that which any one else obtained then or at any time. Education involves an individu-
alized interaction between student and environment and is unique to each person. Overgeneraliza-
tion about its effects can be disastrous. See R. LINDSEY, THE FALCON AND THE SNOWMAN (1979)
for an illustration of a major security leak resulting from assumptions based on knowledge of an
individual's family background.
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This tendency to identify with persons "like ourselves" and to pro-
ject upon them characteristics and attributes which we believe we have, is
an important element in the necessarily subjective judgments which pre-
dict future performance. The higher the job level, the more visible will
be the performance of the person selected, and the greater the pressures
on the selecting personnel will be to demonstrate their acumen. This
pressure increases the likelihood that a "bias toward the familiar" will
occur in the selection process.8 9
Subjective judgments are most common in the promotion and dis-
charge situation because there is more data on which they can be based.
The employee already has a "track record," with supervisors and co-
workers, and has been observed in a myriad of work related situations. 90
A "net judgment" on probable future performance which is sensitively
rooted in past experience may be the preferred form of decisionmaking,
as long as it does not incorporate discriminatory factors. In contrast, the
hiring of a new employee is likely to be based on more formal "objective"
background requirements, and a brief encounter with supervisory per-
sonnel. These requirements can, with relative ease, be subjected to dispa-
rate impact analysis. 9'
The courts have long recognized that the use of subjective judg-
ments in personnel decisions provides a ready occasion for the applica-
tion of discriminatory perceptions-stereotypical ideas such as, for
example, that women are not tough enough or aggressive enough for
some kinds of work.92 The leading case is Rowe v. General Motors,9 3
decided in 1972, which addressed the probabilities that white supervisors
making subjective judgments would fairly consider blacks for supervisory
positions in Georgia. The court said, "We and others have expressed a
skepticism that Black persons dependent directly on decisive recommen-
dations from Whites can expect non-discriminatory action."'94 The re-
89. KANTOR, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977); Bartholet, Application of Title
VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982); Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The
Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv./CIv. RTS. DEv. 673 (1985) [hereinafter
New Patterns].
90. The situation is similar to that which Horace Greeley perceived when he was threatened by
a libel action by James Fennimore Cooper. "He will not bring it in New York, for we are known
here, nor in Ostego, for he is known there." N.Y. Tribune, Nov. 29, 1841, at 2, col.l.
91. See, e.g., the analysis of a prior experience requirement in Walker v. Jefferson County
Home, 726 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1984).
92. In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I11. 1986), the employer intro-
duced expert testimony that stereotypes of women's interests were "true" in an effort to explain a
smaller applicant pool of women for sales jobs. See Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyp-
ing Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345 (1980).
93. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
94. Id. at 359.
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markable improvement in promotional opportunities for minorities and
women since 1965 makes it impossible to draw the categorical conclusion
which was suggested in Rowe. White male managers have promoted
many minorities and women. 95
In Rowe, white foremen had not recommended black workers for
"white jobs" and, in the court's view, were unlikely to do So. 9 6 There-
fore, the use of subjective judgments constituted a "built in headwind"
under the Griggs test.97 Is there still a sufficient "tilt" against promotion
of minorities and women some fourteen years after Rowe, to require an
interpretation of the statute to counterbalance it? Many employers have
adopted personnel practices which no longer restrict minority/female op-
portunities, but many have not. How should the law deal with this more
complex situation? A simple answer to this question is no longer
possible. 9 8
A. Division Among the Circuits
The courts of appeal are divided on whether to apply the Griggs
principle to employment decisions based on subjective judgments. The
Griggs principle has been applied to "subjective judgments" in the Sec-
ond, "old" Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Cir-
cuits. However, nearly half the circuits, following the lead of Pouncy v.
Prudential Insurance Co. ,99 hold that Griggs is not applicable to "subjec-
tive judgments." They require a plaintiff who challenges a pattern of
subjective decisions to proceed under the disparate treatment approach.
This view is held by the First, Fourth, "new" Fifth, Eighth and Tenth
circuits. The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits are on both sides of the
issue.t°° The Seventh Circuit has tentatively decided to apply Griggs to
95. See, e.g., EEOC v. IBM, 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984) for an illustration of an effective
Affirmative Action Program for high level jobs.
96. 457 F.2d at 359.
97. The first major conciliation agreement under Title VII required identification of black
workers "qualified" to become supervisors. In administering the agreement, the government found
that there were no uniform standards, other than a recommendation from the candidate's supervisor.
All the supervisors were white and few blacks had ever become supervisors. White foremen were
then asked to identify those black workers who in their view were qualified for supervisors. They
identified 150 of the 400 eligible blacks as qualified. See A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT
AND THE LAW 358-59 (1971).
98. Discretionary Decisionmaking, supra note 13, would consider the nature of the employer,
the decisionmaking process used, possible bias in measurement methods and whether the job being
filled required the exercise of discretion.
99. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). In Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.
1984), the 5th Circuit itself did apply disparate impact analysis to a "subjective judgment" system,
relying on the statement in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15, that, "either theory
may ... be applied to a particular set of facts."
100. The restriction of Griggs to specific identified employment practices was articulated in
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subjective judgment cases' 0 and the Third Circuit has not addressed this
issue.
This difference in approach is important because of the conse-
quences which flow from the choice of analysis. Disparate impact is eas-
ier to establish than disparate treatment. Proof of "disparate impact"
need not rise to the level of statistical significance.10 2 Once disparate
impact is shown, the burden is on the employer to justify its system as a
"business necessity." In contrast, the disparate treatment approach
places a heavier burden on the plaintiff because it requires proof of dis-
criminatory intent. Plaintiff's statistical evidence must meet the stan-
dard of "statistical significance." Plaintiff has the burden of persuasion
at all times. Defendant can justify its actions if it has a "legitimate busi-
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). The court suggested that "disparate
impact" raised an inference of intentional discrimination, that its extension to matters of subjective
judgment was unfair to employers because they would be required to justify specific practices which
had not been shown to have disparate impact, and would pose problems of establishing "causation."
Id. at 800. Pouncy was followed without discussion of its reasoning in the Sixth Circuit, Geisler v.
Folsom, 735 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1984); the Fourth Circuit, EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d
633, 638 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th
Cir. 1982); in the "new" Fifth Circuit, Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1985); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188
(5th Cir. 1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin St. Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1983); the
Eighth Circuit, Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 952 (1984); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit refused
to find a practice to which Griggs could apply in dealing with the "subjective judgment" in Morten-
sen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982).
The courts which do apply Griggs to subjective judgments are: The Second Circuit, Zahorik v.
Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Business Necessity" justified use of subjective
judgments in University tenure process); the "old" Fifth, Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
348 (5th Cir. 1972) (the grandfather of the cases suggesting that subjective judgments are a fertile
ground for discrimination); one decision in the "new" Fifth Circuit, Page v. U.S. Indus. Inc., 726
F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984); the Sixth Circuit, Rowe v. Cleveland Pnuematic Co., Numerical
Control, Inc., 690 F.2d 88, 93 n. 10 (6th Cir. 1982); the Eighth Circuit, EEOC v. Rath Packing Co.,
787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986); the Ninth Circuit, Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477
(9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); the Tenth Circuit, Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985);
Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981); the Eleventh Circuit,
Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523-25 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (relying on former rule in 5th Circuit and
adducing support for view from Supreme Court decisions, legislative history and the risk that exclu-
sion of subjective judgments from the Griggs principle would expand employer reliance on subjective
decisionmaking); and the District of Columbia Circuit, Seger v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985). Seger refuted the analysis in Pouncy in two ways; first,
the application of Griggs to subjective judgments would force the employer to identify and defend
only those parts of the process which had adverse impact, 738 F.2d at 1271, and secondly, that
Griggs was not simply a surrogate for proof of intention, but an independent starting point in statu-
tory analysis. 738 F.2d at 1266.
101. Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 1986).
102. "Statistical significance" is that convention among statisticians which is a sufficient statisti-
cal difference from an expected value to disprove the null hypothesis that the observed relationship is
a matter of accident. See, e.g., Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d at 1047-51. The "Eighty Percent"
or "4/5th" Rule of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D
(1986), is intended to simplify a finding of disparate impact. It does not necessarily yield "statistical
significance." See supra note 13.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ness reason," a less onerous formulation than showing "business neces-
sity.' 10 3 The reason for this difference in formulation is that a
"legitimate business reason" negatives the discriminatory intent required
in disparate treatment cases even though it may not rise to the level of
"business necessity." Furthermore, the disparate treatment case is indi-
vidualized, making it more difficult to maintain a class action than under
the Griggs type analysis.'0o
CHART I
DISPARATE TREATMENT DISPARATE IMPACT
Plaintiff Proves: Comparative Evidence Plus Disparate Impact
Statistical Significance (80% Rule)
Defendant Establishes: Legitimate Non - Business Necessity
Discriminatory Reason
Burden of Persuasion: Always on Plaintiff On Defendant Re
"Necessity"
Class Action? Rarely Often
The federal agencies have concluded that subjective judgments are
subject to the Griggs principle. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures (UGESP), adopted after notice and comment
rulemaking procedures by the EEOC, the Departments of Labor and
Justice, and the Civil Service Commission, take the position that subjec-
tive judgments constitute a "Selection Procedure" which must be vali-
dated or altered, if it has adverse impact. 0 5 As a practical matter, the
decision to apply a disparate impact analysis to subjective decisionmak-
ing may often determine the issue of liability favorably to employees be-
cause of the difficulties of establishing the necessity for the use of the
process. 106
103. See Player, Defining "Legitimacy" in Disparate Treatment Cases. Motivational Inference as
a Talisman for Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 855, 856-57 (1985).
104. This is particularly true since General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) narrowed the
application of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 in discrimination cases. See also Bartholet, Application of Title VII
to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1004-06 (1982).
105. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1B (1986). Subjective judgments seeking "interpersonal skills" or
"leadership ability" must, under the UGESP, be validated under a theory of "content validity," 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14(c)(1) or "construct validity" which is difficult to establish. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.14(d)(l).
106. Employers have lost the reported cases which apply disparate impact theory to subjective
decisions. See infra note 149. One decision to the contrary is Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85,
95-96 (9th Cir. 1984) where the Ninth Circuit not only found that there was no disparate impact, but
also found that the University's procedure in denying professors tenure was the academic equivalent
of a business necessity.
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B. What Constitutes a "Subjective Judgment" Case
The standardless individualized personnel decision based on the un-
guided discretion of a supervisor would seem to be archetypical of the
kind of "subjective judgment" we are considering. 10 7 We should also
include those decision processes which require that objective factors be
taken into account in arriving at a decision, but do not assign weights to
the objective factors. They become unstructured inputs into a "net" sub-
jective judgment. However, two courts of appeals have erroneously char-
acterized employer systems which had "objective" dimensions as being
subjective, one of which was subsequently reversed. A panel of the Ninth
Circuit in Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,108 held that a "word of
mouth" recruitment system involves subjective judgment and was there-
fore immune from the disparate impact principle. This conclusion was
wrong, and was reversed by the court of appeals en banc. 109 A decision
to rely on "word of mouth" recruitment is a decision to adopt a system
or method of accomplishing the hiring task. While the system may in-
corporate a "subjective judgment" as to who is notified, this does not
destroy the fact that the system as such can be observed and described.1 10
Similarly, in Hawkins v. Bounds, 11 the Tenth Circuit held that the
practice of assigning particular employees to temporary duty in higher
level positions so that they could acquire experience which would give
them an advantage in securing the position permanently, was a "subjec-
tive" decision. This conclusion is also erroneous. The practice of as-
signing individuals temporarily to higher level jobs and then relying on
the experience they obtain in those jobs is not itself subjective. It is capa-
ble of proof and evaluation in precisely the same manner as a written test
or education requirement. 1 12 The identity of the persons who are as-
signed may be established by subjective decisionmaking, but that does
not make the practice itself, "subjective." The concept of "subjective de-
cisions" should be applied to individualized personnel actions made with-
out the use of generalized "objective criteria," and to decisions which
"take account" of objective factors, but are not limited to a consideration
107. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Rowe v. General Motors,
457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
108. 768 F.2d 1120, rev'd, 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
109. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
110. See the definition of "system" in California Brewers v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 606 n.15
(1980). For a discussion of word of mouth recruiting, see Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 465, 477-78 (1968), reprinted in A. BLUM-
ROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 218-304 (1971).
111. 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985). The court applied the Griggs principle.
112. See Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 669 F.2d 667, 671-72 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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of these factors and allow the decision maker substantial unstructured
leeway in judgment.
C. Arguments Concerning the Application of Griggs
to Subjective Judgments
The difference among the circuits concerning the application of
Griggs to subjective judgments conceals a dispute about the Griggs con-
cept itself. The courts which refuse to apply Griggs to the subjective
judgment process consider that the disparate impact doctrine is a surro-
gate or proxy method of proving deliberate discrimination. "t3 They inter-
pret Griggs as acknowledging the difficulty of proving intentional
discrimination by making it easier for the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case and placing a heavy burden on the defendants to justify their
practices. But beneath these "procedural" rules, the quest is still for
"intent." In that quest, it is unfair to require the employer to defend a
range of practices in order to respond to a general challenge to the use of
subjective judgments.
The courts which do apply Griggs to subjective judgments adopt a
fundamentally different approach. "Intentional discrimination" is sim-
ply not at issue. Griggs bans practices which, regardless of intent, have
an unjustified disparate impact on minorities. The particular cause or
source of the impact may not matter at all, and may never be identified.
Griggs was intended to minimize the significance of all non-job-related
criteria which restrict opportunities of disfavored groups. 1 4 It was not
concerned with the fault of the employer; in the Griggs decision itself, the
"fault" lay in the inferior educational opportunities afforded blacks by
the state, not with the employer.
Under this view, when the plaintiff has demonstrated that subjective
judgments have a disparate impact, the employer is required to justify
them by as rigorous an analysis as the situation permits. This approach
presupposes that there still exists a subtle predisposition to assume that
113. See supra note 100. This view is articulated in Justice Powell's dissent in Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982): "In disparate-impact cases . . . the plaintiff seeks to carry his
burden of proof by way of inference-by showing that an employer's selection process results in the
rejection of a disproportionate number of members of a protected group.... From such a showing a
fair inference then may be drawn that the rejected applicant ... was himself a victim .. " It is also
found in Pouncy, 668 F.2d 795.
114. This approach is articulated in Justice Brennan's opinion in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
at 448. "When an employer uses a non-job-related barrier in order to deny a minority or woman
applicant employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant adverse effect on minorities or
women, then the applicant has been deprived of an employment opportunity 'because of . . .
race. . . .' " My own view agrees with Justice Brennan on the scope of Griggs, but with Justice
Powell on the application of Griggs in Teal. See Group Interest, supra note 71.
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minorities and women are less able than white males. While we no
longer utilize crude stereotypes of race or sex inferiority, our subjective
judgments are still likely to tilt against minorities and women." 5 The
adverse impact principle applied to the overall process is an effective way
to counter this tilt because it requires the employer to justify its deci-
sional process.
D. Precedent, Policy, and Practicality Concerning the Subjective
Judgment Issue
1. Precedent
The question of which approach is "preferable" requires a consider-
ation of precedent and policy. The legislative history is of little assist-
ance. 116 Language in Supreme Court opinions supports the view that the
Griggs principle applies to subjective judgments which produce disparate
impact. 117 At the same time, the facts in all of the Supreme Court dispa-
rate impact cases involve specific practices, not generalized subjective
hiring practices. 18 Thus, the courts which limit Griggs to specific prac-
tices interpret the Supreme Court decisions in light of those facts.
The Supreme Court cases which do involve "subjective judgments"
have been analyzed in terms of intentional discrimination. In McDonnell
Douglas v. Green,'19 the employer did not want to hire a specific em-
115. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985). See New Pat-
terns, supra note 89.
116. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
117. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) itself applied to "practices, procedures or tests," id. at 430,
"tests or criteria for employment or promotion," id. at 43 1, "the consequences of employment prac-
tices, employment procedures or testing mechanisms," id. at 432, "broad and general testing de-
vices," id. at 433 and "testing or measuring procedures," id. at 436.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) (citations omitted), "the Court has repeat-
edly held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are
neutral on their face and in intent but nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular group."
"One kind of practice 'fair in form, but discriminatory in operation' is that which perpetuates
the effects of prior discrimination."
In General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982), the court stated, "[s]ignificant
proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a
class of both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promo-
tion practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes." (emphasis added).
118. Griggs involved a high school diploma requirement and two written tests. Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) involved a written test; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) involved height and weight requirements; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) involved a
written test. The written test in Albemarle, was faulted by the Court in part because the test scores
were validated by unstructured subjective supervisory judgments. The Court said that "It]here is no
way of knowing precisely what criteria of job performance the supervisors were considering, whether
each of the supervisors was considering the same criteria or whether, indeed, any of the supervisors
actually applied a focused and stable body of criteria of any kind." 422 U.S. at 433.
119. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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ployee because of his past "disruptive tactics." The Court concluded
that this "predictive evaluation" had to be measured by an "intent" stan-
dard. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,120 the
Court held that a conclusion that plaintiff "did not get alone well" with
other workers was a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for discharge
of a supervisor. This conclusion is normally based on a series of observa-
tions and not on a single incident. It is not readily subject to documenta-
tion, or to refutation on cross-examination. This rationale is typical of
cases in which "subjective judgment" is used. Another example is Hazel-
wood School District v. United States 121 which involved subjective judg-
ments in teacher selection. Hazelwood was tried as an intent case.
2. Policy
The Griggs principle was designed to prevent discrimination in the
general society from unnecessarily limiting employment opportunities.
This was illustrated in Griggs by Chief Justice Burger's analysis of the
relation between discrimination in education and opportunities to vote
and to work.
[Iln the present case, "whites register far better on the Company's
alternative requirements" [in securing a passing score on a written test]
than Negroes. This consequence would appear to be directly traceable
to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to man-
ifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, peti-
tioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools....
[Iln Gaston County v. United States... because of the inferior educa-
tion received by Negroes in North Carolina, this Court barred the in-
stitution of a literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the
test would abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race.1 22
This illustration of how inferior education can interfere with em-
ployment and voting rights, demonstrates the linkage between subordina-
tion of minorities in one area of life and their opportunities in another: a
linkage which the law was intended to cut, in the absence of demon-
strated necessity. The more general form of this reasoning is as follows:
the restriction of opportunities for minorities and women in many areas
of life was the subject of the Civil Rights Act. Congress intended to
prevent any unnecessary extension of these restrictions from one area of
life to another. Title VII should be interpreted to carry out this objec-
tive. 123 The "intention" concept of discrimination does not carry out this
120. 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981).
121. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
122. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
123. See Affirmative Action Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (1986).
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objective; rather it permits employers "in good faith" to transpose re-
strictions in education into a denial of employment. Therefore, the court
will devise and apply a concept of discrimination which is more conso-
nant with the legislative objective, which focuses on "the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation."1 24 This is the "un-
derlying reasoning" of the Griggs opinion and should guide its applica-
tion to the subjective judgment issue. 125
In light of the vast improvement in minority-female employment op-
portunities since Griggs, some reassessment of Griggs was inevitable, and
has taken place. 126  While some have suggested that this is due to the
more conservative attitude of the administration in recent years, I believe
that this more conservative attitude is a political response to changing
public opinion. The general public is less sympathetic to conditions of
minorities today because, in part, of the visible improvement in minority
and female job situations. 127 Public support for goals and timetables de-
teriorated after the visible improvement in minority and female opportu-
nities described above had taken place. By 1980, there was a significant
sense that vigorous affirmative action was no longer necessary because
"things were better."'' 28 Older persons saw the improvement as substan-
tial, younger persons could not believe that the world of 1950's-60's had
been as racist-sexist, and some middle aged workers did not want to see
their opportunities restricted. Building on this change in public attitude,
the Reagan Administration began to retrench the federal posture toward
minorities. This visible improvement in minority opportunity was also
bound to affect the judicial perception of the problem-the judges "situa-
tion sense" as Karl Llewellyn put it.129
Fourteen years ago, I suggested that improved minority opportuni-
ties would lead to a reassessment of the application of Griggs.130 The
124. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
125. Strangers in Paradise, supra note 10. Helfand & Pemberton, supra note 69, suggest that the
absence of a clearly articulated general rationale for the Griggs principle has engendered a variety of
attacks upon it. They find their rationale in Teal's focus on the word "opportunities" in the statute.
Justice Powell's "substitute for intent" rationale is also found in Teal, 457 U.S. 440.
126. See Law Transmission System, supra note 6.
127. See Blumrosen, Expanding the Concept of Affirmative Action to Address Contemporary Con-
ditions, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 297 (1975) [hereinafter Expanding Affirmative Action];
New Patterns, supra note 89.
128. See New Patterns, supra note 89, suggesting that the improvement was more visible than
real. POLITICS, supra note 28, demonstrates the crucial role of public opinion in securing the passage
of the Civil Rights Act, and suggests that 'political leaders' followed the public mood but did not
create it.
129. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about
How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 398 (1950).
130. Strangers in Paradise, supra note 10, at 102, 106:
This article has been concerned with the positive scope of the Griggs principle because of
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time for that reassessment has arrived as the differences in the courts of
appeal about the scope of Griggs indicate. The question of whether
Griggs is applicable to "subjective judgments" provides an excellent op-
portunity for such a reconsideration by the Supreme Court. However, in
undertaking this reconsideration, the court should not eliminate general
categories of employment decisions from the disparate impact principle.
In my view, it is erroneous to exempt any generic type of employ-
ment practice from the operation of the Griggs principle. Griggs should
continue to apply to the totality of practices, including subjective judg-
ments, of employers whose work forces reflect the continued restriction
or exclusion of minorities/women. However, those employers who have
contributed to improvement of minority/female opportunity for a gen-
eral category of employees should no longer be subject to as rigorous
application of the Griggs principle with respect to that category of em-
ployees. 13 ' In relaxing the application of Griggs in such a situation, more
leeway may be given to the use of subjective judgments. This principle
must be applied with care. The focus should be on categories of employ-
ees as defined by the EEOC in EEO-1 forms, or categories used by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The focus should not be on the total work
force of the employer, because this would permit relaxed scrutiny of
those who employed minorities or women primarily in lower ranked jobs.
Thus, for example, in a case involving lawyers the employer could show
its inclusion of minorities or women in the class of professionals as a
the outer reaches of Griggs will determine the extent to which the law will cope with ine-
quality in employment opportunities. Yet, it is also necessary to consider the other side of
the coin, the question of Griggs' limits. If discrimination is defined by the presence of
"built in headwinds" against minority groups, then the absence of this adverse effect on
minorities would force plaintiffs back to the evil-motive and equal-treatment tests of
discrimination.
... Griggs does not demand that the work force of each large employer should be a
microcosm of the total population or labor force. Griggs only requires that the structures
responsible for restricting minority opportunity be destroyed. . . . Therefore, numerical
standards are an appropriate tool. But carried to a pseudological conclusion, such stan-
dards would structure opportunities on society along lines of race, national origin and sex.
The individualist strain in our traditions stands against that proposition .... Thus, the use
of this third concept of discrimination should be decreased, and the range of employer
discretion increased, as the crude consequences of minority subordination are eliminated.
We will revert back toward evil-motive and equal-treatment concepts of discrimination
when the social system operates in a fairer way.
13 1. This is the fundamental principle behind my support for the "Bottom Line" concept. See
Bottom Line, supra note 86; Group Interest, supra note 71. The Griggs principle contains a self
limiting element in the concept of "disparate impact." When employment practices do not produce
such impact, the concept is inapplicable. The text here suggests a relaxation of Griggs with respect
to employer practices concerning classes of employees as defined by the Bureau of Census or EEO-1
categories.
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reason for released application of Griggs to subjective judgments, but not
its inclusion of minorities or women as clericals or blue collar workers.
The difference between types of employers is illustrated by a com-
parison of two cases: Rowe v. General Motors,132 and EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck, Inc. 133 Both cases involved subjective judgments, and both in-
volved a defense that the employer had taken affirmative action. But in
Rowe, the affirmative action consisted of "good intentions" which had
not been translated into reality; there were no black supervisors. In
Sears, the district court stated:
During the period from 1973 through 1980, Sears never hired
fewer than 20 percent women into full time commission sales and 37
percent women into part time commission sales in any year. Sears
hired as many as 40 percent women into full time commission sales,
and 52 percent women into part time commission sales. Between 1973
and 1979, the female percentage of full time commission sales hires
doubled from 20 to 40 percent.
From 1974 through 1980, Sears promoted 11,428 noncommission
salespersons to commission sales at 992 Sears stores across the nation.
Of those promotions, 53.5 percent went to women. . . . The female
proportion of promotions from noncommission to part time commis-
sion sales exceeded 50 percent in every year from 1974 through 1980,
reaching a high of 62.2 percent in 1975.
The female percentage of commission sales promotions varied
substantially by product line. For both full time and part time employ-
ees, the proportion of women promoted into commission sales has al-
ways exceeded the proportion of women hired to sell both products in
which women have been more interested and products which women
have not been very interested in selling .... This is the result of the
success of Sears' affirmative action efforts in promoting women into
commission sales who otherwise would not have applied for the
positions. 134
This "effective affirmative action" justification reflects the social
progress which has been achieved under Title VII. The Griggs principle
should be eased with respect to those employees who have participated
meaningfully in the process but should remain in full force with respect
to those who have not.1 35 This approach rejects the suggestion in
Pouncy, that the Griggs principle should not apply under any circum-
stances to employer decisions based on subjective judgments.
132. 457 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1972).
133. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I11. 1986).
134. Id. at 1319 (citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., EEOC v. IBM, 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984).
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3. Practicality
What are the practical consequences of applying the disparate im-
pact concept to employment decisions based on "subjective judgments"?
Professor Bartholet has suggested that employers will be required to "ob-
jectify" their decisions by paying attention to "rational" considera-
tions. 136 Professor Maltz has argued that this would make the decisional
process too costly and time consuming, even if it improved the quality of
the decisions. 137
Professor Lamber would apply Griggs to cases involving the use of
subjective judgments unless the employer was filling jobs the perform-
ance of which required making of "discretionary" or "subjective" deci-
sions.'3 8 This formulation, while more refined, would still exclude huge
numbers of jobs from the ambit of Griggs, regardless of the employer's
overall posture toward minorities or women. Since I do not believe these
personnel decisions can be fully "objectified," nor do I believe that em-
ployers should be given a method by which they may exclude minorities
or women through the use of subjective judgments, I approach the mat-
ter somewhat differently than Professors Bartholet, Maltz or Lamber.
The procedures used in a "subjective judgment" case illuminate the
doctrinal problem. Employers almost always defend their decisions on
the ground that they selected the "better qualified candidate."'' 39 The
"disparate impact" standard requires the employer to establish that the
selection process was justified by the business necessity of obtaining "bet-
ter qualified" workers. In proving disparate impact, plaintiffs claim a
disparity between proportion of minorities in the pool of candidates and
in the group selected. Employers may argue that the comparison is im-
proper because minorities or women in the pool are not qualified. '40 This
was essentially the defense raised in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, Inc. '4'
This defense requires identification of "objective" criteria against which
to measure the pool.
If the disparate impact statistics do produce a prima facie case of
136. Bartholet, supra note 104, at 957-58, 989-98.
137. Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment-A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw.
U.L. REV. 776 (1983).
138. Discretionary Decisionmaking, supra note 13.
139. To the extent that the employer used "objective criteria" the Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures are applicable. Where "subjective standards" are used, it does not hurt
to insist that they be in writing, but it does not advance matters much to have a written policy that
states only that the employer will promote "the best qualified candidate."
140. EEOC v. IBM, 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984). The courts agree that the "pool" is to be
defined by "objective" standards.
141. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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discrimination, the employer then bears the burden of demonstrating the
"business necessity" for using the subjective method of selection. 42 The
employer may argue that there is no other practical way to select candi-
dates for the position.1 43 The premise of this argument is that there are
no "objective" methods of deciding which candidate will do "better" in
situations as yet unforeseen, in which they will be required to exercise
independent judgment. As part of this argument, the employer should
also demonstrate that the approach using subjective judgments has pro-
duced satisfactory candidates. While this is not evidence that objective
standards would not produce such candidates and has an element of the
self-serving and self-proving, it is essential that the employer establish
that its system "works." This demonstration is furthered by comparative
evidence which seeks to explain, albeit on subjective grounds, why the
decisionmaker preferred a white/male over a minority/female. 144 The
employer may also seek to establish business necessity by showing that
there is no alternative with lesser disparate impact which will "equally
serve" the interest in production. 145
If the employer is unable to rebut the prima facie case or establish
business necessity, the court may declare the practice discriminatory, en-
join it and require defendant to develop a system which meets legal
standards. 146
After a finding of discrimination, the matter goes into "second
142. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986); Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Health & Human Serv., 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984).
143. This is the gist of Prof. Lamber's argument. See Discretionary Decisionmaking, supra note
13.
144. The explanatory power required of the employer will necessarily be in inverse relation to
the degree of disparate impact. The "inexorable zero" should require extraordinary strong compara-
tive evidence. For this reason, the decision in Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis.,
769 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1947 (1986) is wrong. The defendant's com-
parative evidence was weak, and its record of inclusion of females was negligible. Many university
denial of tenure cases fit the mold of the subjective judgment issue considered here. After the "objec-
tive evidence" of scholarly contribution and reputation is considered, there remains an irreducible
subjective estimate of the candidates potential as scholar, teacher and colleague. Even the so called
"objective evidence" of scholarly reputation is a matter on which scholars may differ widely. See
Lempert, From the Editor, 19 LAW & Soc. REV. 529, 530-33 (1985) describing the variation in
reviews of scholarly manuscripts.
145. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). This aspect of the defendant's case is
much like the elements of a bona fide occupational qualification under the Age Discrimination Act,
where the Supreme Court has indicated that a compulsory retirement age limit below that permitted
by the statute will be allowed only if (1) all or substantially all those identified for retirement will be
unable to perform the functions of the job and (2) it is not possible to individualize decisions as to the
capability of individuals to perform. Western Airlines v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
146. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976). This will necessitate, in all probability, a narrowing of the range of subjective
judgments by adding "objective" components to the decisional process, or by removing the "subjec-
tive" requirements. It might require replacing the "subjective" standard with another formulation,
depending on the proof. See Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 744 F.2d 1289
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stage" proceedings, in which members of the class come forward with the
benefit of the finding of overall discrimination, and seek individual relief.
The employer can defend against each individual claim on the ground
that it did not discriminate because the candidate who was preferred was
"better qualified. '' 47
Thus there are three stages in the "disparate impact" case where the
employer can press the "better qualified candidate" argument: (1) in re-
butting the statistical claim of impact discrimination; (2) in justifying se-
lection decisions based on business necessity and (3) in demonstrating
that a given plaintiff was not a victim of any discrimination which had
been found. Since the proof is similar in all situations, employers are
well advised to present it in the first stage, as part of a rebuttal to the
statistical claim of disparate impact.
This discussion illustrates the functional consequence of a showing
of disparate impact of subjective employment procedures. It places the
burden of demonstrating the utility of the procedures and the results
achieved by it on the employer. Given the vast number of personnel
decisions favoring minorities and women which have been made in the
past fifteen years, it is highly appropriate to place this burden of judicial
scrutiny on those employers who have not made such decisions, but have
continued older practices of restriction. 48 If the consequence of impos-
ing the burden is that the subjective judgment process is found illegal, the
employer is properly required to reform that system, even at a risk of loss
of some hypothetical efficiency.
The conclusion of this analysis is that where the employer has
(a) not participated meaningfully in affirmative action and (b) has uti-
lized subjective judgments in decision making which (c) have had a dis-
parate impact on minorities and/or women, the employer must
demonstrate that its judgments have taken full account of objective crite-
ria and appear under a searching examination to result in the selection of
the better qualified candidates than practical alternative procedures
would produce.
(7th Cir. 1984). It may also lead to the imposition of "Goals and Timetables" to assure that the
revised procedures do not continue their exclusionary effect.
147. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1454 (2d ed. 1983).
148. The McDonnell Douglas Court recognized that statistics showing the restriction or exclu-
sion of minorities are relevant in evaluating individual cases. 411 U.S. at 805 n. 19. Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-78 (1978) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981) make the point that the defendant does not have to maximize the employment or
promotion of minorities or demonstrate that it has hired the better qualified candidate. However,
neither case suggests that an employer may adopt a practice which minimizes the hiring or promo-
tion of minorities or may hire a lesser qualified white candidate. This would be contrary to both
Griggs and McDonnell Douglas. See EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d at 333.
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This is a narrower concept than others might propose. Professor
Bartholet believes that Title VII law, which requires use of objective
standards with respect to blue collar workers, can be applied in these
cases. 149 I disagree. The subjectivity inherent in decisions about "jobs in
high places" cannot be readily squeezed out, as we who participate in
promotion and tenure decisions know. 150 These "subjective" decisions in-
volve a prediction by hiring officials of how competing candidates will
deal with situations whose contours are not yet known. There is no
known way to "objectify" these decisions.
In suggesting an examination of affirmative action results as an al-
ternative to "objectification" I have drawn on some experience as a labor
arbitrator. Except in the relatively rare case where a witness was demon-
strated to be untrustworthy, my search as an arbitrator was always for
some extrinsic evidence to support or refute the testimony. Since the
ultimate issue in "intent" cases is the "state of mind" of the actor, and
one ultimate issue in an "impact" case is the validity of the employer's
justification, a quest for extrinsic objective evidence of the attitude of the
employer is appropriate. The most reliable guide to this "state of mind"
are statistics which demonstrate either exclusion or inclusion of minori-
ties or women.' 51 This approach will help workers in jobs with few mi-
nority or female incumbents. Employers will find it difficult to satisfy the
Griggs principle where they have used subjective judgments in an exclu-
sionary manner. They will and should lose most such cases. 152 But it
will not help workers once the employment statistics are no longer so
one-sided. In those cases employees will lose unless they can establish
disparate treatment. 153 This result is an appropriate "reward" for those
employers who have included minorities and women in their work force.
The approach suggested here will encourage employers to increase mi-
149. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
150. See Justice Stevens' description of a "necessarily subjective judgment" concerning a candi-
date for continuation in medical school, as involving "judgment, self discipline and ability to handle
stress." Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 515 n.14 (1985).
151. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05 and Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. at 850 both acknowledge the relevance of evidence of affirmative action.
152. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986); Hawkin v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500
(10th Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (analyzed as disparate treat-
ment); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 745 F.2d
1373 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1984); Caviale v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 744 F.2d at 1289.
153. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) permits the inclusion of evidence of
affirmative action to negative intent. The Supreme Court "watered down" the operation of the
Griggs principle in light of evidence of successful affirmative action hiring of minorities in New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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nority and female participation in the work force, in order to reduce the
risk of a finding of discrimination in particular cases.
E. The "Subjective Judgment" Issue in the Cases
In an attempt to identify the factors that appear to influence judicial
decisionmaking in subjective judgment cases, all cases under the category
"Promotion"--etc., in Volumes 34 through 36 of the Fair Employment
Practice, covering cases reported between March 3, 1984 and February
23, 1985 were individually examined. 1 54 Most of the cases studied were
decided after the recent pronouncement concerning the processing of in-
dividual claims by the Supreme Court 55 and therefore presumably fol-
lowed the Supreme Court instructions concerning the trial of these
claims.
My conclusions from this analysis are as follows:
(1) Where courts have upheld the employer's subjective decision
denying plaintiff's promotion, or upholding a discharge, the most promi-
nent factor reported in the opinions has been the positive equal employ-
ment results:1 56
(a) The presence of members of the same race or sex as the plaintiff
in the job or job group which plaintiff sought has been relied upon in
upholding job denials based on subjective judgments;15 7
(b) The presence of members of plaintiff's racial or sex group in the
reviewing or decisionmaking process has been relied upon as a basis for
154. The Index Headings for the cases studied were: Race Discrimination; 108.3178; Promotion;
Selection of Supervisor and 108.3185-Evaluation of Employees Merit Selection; Sex Discrimina-
tion; 108.4164 Promotion; filling of vacancies; selection, 108.425 1-Evaluation of employees: merit
systems in general.
155. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
156. Disparate impact claim; business necessity demonstrated in adoption of worker participa-
tion program, Ellison v. Best Foods, A Div. of C.P.C. Int'l, 589 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
Inclusion of members of affected class may mean no disparate impact is found. Almendral v. New
York State Office of Mental Health, 568 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd in part, 743 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1984). Disparate treatment claims based on subjective judgment rebutted by demonstration
of operationally effective affirmative action policies and statistics, Gairola v. Virginia Dep't of Gen.
Serv., 753 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1985); Hagens v. Clark, 752 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. NLRB,
750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985); Burrows v. Chemed Corp., 743 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1984); Grann v.
City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc.,
726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. IBM, 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984); Jones v. Continental
Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 66 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Love v. Alamance County Bd. of
Educ., 581 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.C. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 1504 (4th Cir. 1985); Ramon v. Smith, 34
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 404 (D. Tex. 1984); Coser v. Moore, 587 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984); Stones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 572 F.
Supp. 1072, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 796 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985); Nicholsen v. Quaker Oats Co., 36 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1534 (6th Cir. 1985); Chaves v. Thomas, 35 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
397 (D.D.C. 1984); Jones v. Konopnicki, 597 F. Supp. 235 (D. Mo. 1984); Reed v. Michigan Bell
Tel., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Mason v. Trustees of Calif. State
Univ., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 315 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
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upholding a subjective decision;' 58
(c) In discharge cases based on "subjective considerations," the pres-
ence of members of plaintiff's race or sex in the group not terminated
has been considered important in upholding the discharge.'
59
(2) In disparate treatment cases, the courts have accepted a "better
qualified" defense of a subjective promotional process, based on the fol-
lowing types of evidence:
(a) Person appointed had greater prior experience in comparable po-
sition, ' 60 a record of steadier employment, 16' better supervision rat-
ings concerning interpersonal skills,' 62  or greater achievement
recognition 63 than did plaintiff;
(b) Persons with whom employer did business either favored the per-
son who obtained the position which plaintiff sought,' 64 or objected to
the poor performance of the plaintiff; 165
(c) Supervisors preferred a "research oriented" assistant, greater
"leadership skills," or greater "enthusiasm";
16 6
158. Ellison v. Best Foods, A Div. of C.P.C. Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Jones v.
Konopnicki, 597 F. Supp. 235 (D. Mo. 1984); Love v. Alamance County Bd. of Educ., 581 F. Supp.
1079 (D.N.C. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 1504 (4th Cir. 1985); Ramon v. Smith, 34 Fair. Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 404 (D. Tex. 1984); Reed v. Michigan Bell Tel., 35 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Coser v. Moore, 587 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir.
1984); Stones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 572 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd,
796 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1986); Groves v. National Tel. Directory Corp., 34 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1872 (D.N.J. 1982); Roberts v. Bailar, 538 F. Supp. 424 (D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd without
opinion, 698 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1982).
159. Plummer v. Aman, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (law firm);
Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 213 (D. La. 1983), aff'd per curiam, 731 F.2d
280 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985) (U.S. Attorney's office). See also Clay v.
Consumer Programs, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2022 (1985) (failure to promote whites as well as blacks indicative on nondiscrimi-
natory nature of the selection process).
160. Nicholson v. Quaker Oats Co., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1534 (6th Cir. 1985);
Gairola v. Virginia Dep't of Gen. Serv., 753 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1984); Parker v. Board of Sch. of
City of Indianapolis Comm'rs, 729 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1984); Baron v. Mary Elizabeth Day Nursery,
34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1199 (D. Iowa 1984); Caston v. Duke Univ., 34 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 107 (D.N.C. 1983); Henry v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 227 (D. Va. 1982).
161. Henry v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 227 (D. Va.
1982).
162. Reed v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204 (E.D. Mich. 1984);
Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 568 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd in
part, 743 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1984); Stones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 572 F. Supp.
1072 (E.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 796 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1986); Groves v. National Tel. Directory Corp.,
34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1872 (D.N.J. 1982).
163. Young v. Lehman, 748 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1984); Chaves v. Thomas, 35 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 397 (D.D.C. 1984); Ramon v. Smith, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 404 (D. Tex.
1984); Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 568 F. Supp. 571 (D. N.Y. 1983),
aff'd in part, 743 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1984).
164. Wear v. Webb Co., 572 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Minn. 1983) (outside consultant and a major
contractor for employer concluded that person who was given job had better qualifications).
165. Reed v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 35 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204 (E.D. Mich. 1984);
Jones v. Continental Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 661 (D. Tenn. 1984).
166. Burrows v. Chemed Corp., 743 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1984) (research oriented); Lujan v.
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(d) Specific incidents of untrustworthiness or unreliability of plain-
tiff,167 or plaintiff's failure of a possibly valid performance test,168
were accepted as reasons for rejecting plaintiff.
(3) In contrast, courts have found that employers failed to "articu-
late a nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting the plaintiff on "subjective
judgment" grounds where:
(a) Supervisors who made decision testified that their motives were
pure, but gave no additional explanation;' 69
(b) Defense that plaintiff has performed inadequately was not ad-
dressed to the time frame of plaintiff's prima facie case;' 70
(c) Defendant which relied unsuccessfully on rebuttal of plaintiff's
statistics, did not introduce either "business necessity" or "business
reason" justification;' 7'
(d) Defendant's witness admitted race was a factor;' 72
(e) Defendant's "lack of qualifications" defense found implausible. 173
(4) The courts found that the employer failed to rebut a prima fa-
cie case, or that its position was a pretext, where:
(a) an alleged experience requirement' 74 or an alleged reorganiza-
Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 584 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), aff'd, 766 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1985) (chosen due to youth, energy and enthusiasm); Clay v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
185, 188 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (leadership skills).
167. Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551 (5th Cir. 1984); Chaves v. Thomas, 35 Fair. Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 397, 397 (D.D.C. 1984); Lee v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 449 (D.N.C. 1984); Reed v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 35 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204,
206-07 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Henry v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 36 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 227, 229 (D. Va. 1982).
168. McCloud v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (D.N.C. 1984) (Test was per-
formance of inspection task which might have been "content valid."); see Uniform Guidelines of
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 160 7-14, C (1986).
169. Freeman v. Lewis, 36 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 677, 685 (D.D.C. 1983).
170. Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 745 F.2d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 1984).
171. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 1986); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); (specialized experience requirement, not justified); Crawford v. Western Elec.
Co., 745 F.2d 1373 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (mechanics of absence of standards for judgment and unwritten
supervisory conclusions not justified); Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 744
F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984) (restriction of pool for consideration of candidates to career managers
whose qualities included, "tenacity, responsibility, oral presentation skills, responsiveness and prob-
lem analysis." No showing that these qualities fit job needs in disparate impact case); Davis v.
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 593 F. Supp. 271 (D. Va. 1984), aff'd in part, 801 F.2d
1332 (4th Cir. 1986) (exclusion of females as locomotive engineers).
172. Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1984); Parsons v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 727 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984)(employer admitted seeking
"super black" for first black foreman).
173. Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 3298 (1985).
174. EEOC v. Exxon Shipping Corp., 745 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir. 1984) (job given to the person
without the experience); Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 997 (6th Cir. 1984); Holsey v. Armour &
Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985) (same as Exxon); Jackson v.
RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc. 743 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3298 (1985);
Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984).
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tion1 7 5 was non-existent;
(b) Employer's explanation was not believed because of restriction or
exclusion of persons of plaintiff's race or sex;
176
(c) Employer's claim that plaintiff had not applied or that employer
was unaware of plaintiff's interest was rejected where the vacancies
were not posted and plaintiff had indicated general interest in
promotion; 1
77
(d) Racial slurs of selection officials indicated bias in decision;178
(e) Evidence from third parties established that employing official
showed bias against working professional women; 179
(f) Plaintiff's alleged poor performance was found to be excellent.180
(5) Subjective judgment as a method of decision has been found
invalid under the disparate impact standard. Employers have not suc-
cessfully established a "business necessity" defense to such systems. 1 8
1
This survey of the "subjective judgment" cases supports the thesis
suggested earlier. First, the general pattern of inclusion or exclusion of
minorities/women from the job group involved in each case is most im-
portant evidence in both impact and treatment cases. Second, other "ob-
jective evidence" is important in deciding the "subjective judgment"
cases. Third, while one case did suggest that employer reliance on sub-
jective judgments could be justified under business necessity standards,
the court required the employer to demonstrate the connection between
its choice of "objective standards" and the subjective qualities it seeks. 182
Thus the conclusion that the Griggs principle should be applied to
subjective judgments is buttressed by the cases which demonstrate that
the courts do take account of the employer's pattern of inclusion or ex-
clusion of minorities and women in this type of case.
175. Burston v. Virginia Dep't of Computer Serv., 595 F. Supp. 644 (D. Va. 1984); Murray v.
Rumsfeld, 35 Fair. Emp. Prac. cas. (BNA) 1167 (D.D.C. 1981).
176. Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1001 (3rd Cir. 1984); De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Freeman v. Adams, 36 Fair. Emp. Prac. Case. (BNA) 677 (D.D.C. 1983); Murray
v. Rumsfeld, 35 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1677 (D.D.C. 1981).
177. Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Curl v. Reavis, 740
F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1984); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1395 (1985); Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 593 F. Supp. 271 (D. Va.
1984), aff'd in part, 803 F.2d 1322 (4th Cir. 1986).
178. Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated, 778 F.2d 1318 (1985). However,
there are many cases in which allegations of racial slurs were either not credited, or held insignificant
with respect to the motivation for the decision.
179. Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1984); Altschuler v. Waiters, 34 Fair. Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 522 (D. Pa. 1983); Fadhl v. Police Dep't of San Francisco, 553 F. Supp. 38, 40 (N.D.
Cal. 1982), rev'd, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1984).
180. Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Tenn. 1983).
181. See supra text accompanying note 152.
182. Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
F. Subjective Judgments in Support of Informal Affirmative Action:
Foresight or Hindsight
How have subjective judgment decisionsfavoring minorities and wo-
men faired under the law? They should have faired well, because the
optimum form of affirmative action is the recognition of qualifications of
minority and female candidates which would go unnoticed under a re-
gime of discriminatory stereotypes. Thus, a process of "leaning over
backwards," or looking for the strong points in minority or female candi-
dates should be encouraged. Furthermore, many decisions under formal
affirmative action programs ultimately require the conclusion that a mi-
nority or female candidate is sufficiently qualified and that a white or
male candidate is not sufficiently superior to justify an override of affirm-
ative action goals. Therefore, no matter how "objective" an affirmative
action plan may be, it is likely to encompass subjective judgments com-
paring the qualities of the various candidates.1 83 Since formal affirmative
action plans have been approved,' 84 we would expect sympathetic treat-
ment by courts and agencies of "informal" affirmative action.
But this has not been the case. Neither the agencies nor the courts
have been sympathetic to the decisional process of a small employer who
does not have an elaborate affirmative action apparatus, but decides to
hire a minority or female, when the decision is rooted in a sense that the
employer should increase its minority or female work force. This is a
particularly strange result in light of the emphasis on voluntary compli-
ance with EEO policies which runs through the cases and administrative
regulations.
The explanation for this lacuna in the law is somewhat complex.
The administrative agencies, the EEOC and OFCCP, in their regulations
concerning affirmative action emphasized the need for planning by the
employer. Under the OFCCP regulations, an affirmative action plan was
the key enforcement tool which the agency devised. 8 -5 Under EEOC
affirmative action guidelines, the employer's "plan" was designed to pro-
vide a justification for affirmative action, as well as a mechanism for it. 186
Thus, both agencies adopted what might be called the "Washington my-
183. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) for a
description of a process of choice under an affirmative action plan.
184. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
185. See Genesis, supra note 18.
186. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (1986). The Guidelines do not require that a plan be in writing, 29
C.F.R. § 1608.4(2)(ii)(d) (1986), nor that it follow a particular form. Therefore it could be argued
that an "intuitive" affirmative action decision could be justified under the guidelines. But the pri-
mary focus of the Guidelines is on a written formal plan.
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opia" of shaping regulations around the image of large corporate bureau-
cracies which engaged in formal planning. The situation of the smaller
employer whose "planning" is informal at best, and may simply repre-
sent an informed hunch about how to proceed, was not directly ad-
dressed by the drafters of the regulations.
Similarly, the two courts of appeal which have considered the prob-
lem of informal affirmative action became preoccupied with the need for
a plan. The concern of the Seventh Circuit in Lehman v. Yellow Freight
Systems, 187 was that "unplanned affirmative action" might ripen unfairly
into "reverse discrimination." Therefore, said the court, affirmative ac-
tion without a plan was reverse discrimination, even if the facts and cir-
cumstances under which the action was taken would, in hindsight, have
justified it. 188 This decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit in a case
involving an employer who did not hire a white police officer only days
before an affirmative action plan for hiring minorities went into effect. 189
Both of these decisions are wrong. Informal affirmative action is the
best way to include minorities and women in the work force. It takes
place with a minimum of tension and publicity. Positive evaluations of
minorities and women may ultimately become part of the ordinary
stream of hiring and promotion decisions. Taking race and sex positively
into account for the purposes of inclusion is a legitimate consideration at
this point in our history. An employer who has no organized plan, but
simply decides to include minorities and women when it is practical and
convenient to do so should not be penalized under the anti-discrimina-
tion law, if its decision is justified in hindsight. If facts concerning that
employer's practices warrant affirmative action under the Supreme Court
opinions and the EEOC guidelines, the employer should not be found in
violation of the statute because it did not go through a formal planning
process. ' 90
There may come a time when this "hindsight" test for reverse dis-
crimination should be abolished, and the employer required to justify, in
advance, any use of race or sex as a positive element in the employment
decision or simply prohibited from any such use. But the statistics cited
187. 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
188. The court stated that the action taken by the employer in hiring black workers would have
been lawful if there had been a plan with a time limit. Id. at 527 n.16.
189. Lilly v. City of Beckley, 615 F. Supp. 137, aff'd, 797 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1986).
190. There is a separate problem with respect to governmental employers who may be required
by constitutional considerations to have a factual basis in advance of their actions. See Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). A further problem exists as to whether Congress, in
extending Title VII to state and local governments, could supercede such requirements. See Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,
107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) for a discusson of these problems.
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at the beginning of this article, impressive as they are, do not suggest that
this time has arrived. As a consequence informal affirmative action
should be encouraged, as Justice Powell suggested some years ago in
Bakke, as preferable even to the formal programs which are still so nec-
essary for continued social progress.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the time has not come to abandon Griggs, it is appropriate to
reconsider the entire gamut of Equal Opportunity Programs which were
designed in the 1940's and implemented in the 1960's. Twelve years ago,
I suggested that we should have public discussion of the question of when
it would be appropriate to reduce or modify formal affirmative action
requirements. 91 The discussion never took place, because neither the
supporters nor opponents of affirmative action wanted it. But events
forced the issue. The visible improvement in employment opportunities
for minorities and women, which resulted from processes unleashed and
channeled by Title VII and Griggs, produced a lessening in public sup-
port for affirmative action. Therefore, the issue moved to the political
forum where the Reagan Administration's anti-affirmative action stance
emerged. I believe the political forces are still roughly in balance on the
issue of affirmative action. It remains useful to discuss the continued
efficacy of some of the mechanisms to address discrimination which were
so painfully developed in the sixties, and to ask whether additional ap-
proaches are now needed. However, the old debate about "affirmative
action versus reverse discrimination" is sterile.
Our success in opening occupations to minorities and women has
outstripped the ideologies of both the Civil Rights Movement and those
who would limit affirmative action in the name of color blindness. The
dialogue about "affirmative action versus reverse discrimination" should
be set aside in favor of a consideration of additional approaches to the
more complex problems of disadvantaged persons in the present environ-
ment. Present reality should become the foundation for a new analysis of
contemporary needs and values. Affirmative action programs should be
continued as necessary, but not sufficient conditions for minority/female
progress.
Current social and economic realities call for additional measures. I
have suggested elsewhere a partial agenda which addresses the contem-
191. Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of
Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 674 (1974).
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porary problems of disadvantaged persons. 192 The Civil Rights Move-
ment should concern itself with taxation of the poor, converting interest
and charitable deductions to tax credits, the thirty-two hour work week,
ensuring safety of persons and property in the cities, insisting on im-
proved educational opportunity for central cities students, and protecting
jobs from foreign law wage competition.
These matters are not exclusively or even primarily the concern of
minorities and women. They have become a concern to the Civil Rights
Movement because of the successes of the programs of the sixties. To a
greater extent than ever before, minorities and women now share some of
the same problems as their white and male counterparts. 193 The ultimate
legacy of Griggs, then, is the opportunity to extend protection to all who
face the "built in headwinds" that flow from birth under unfavorable
circumstances. This is not a new notion.
Justice Powell's explanation that Griggs was concerned that "child-
hood deficiencies in education and background ... resulting from forces
beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious
burden"194 on minorities, echoes a similar sentiment in an earlier setting.
President Wilson's first inaugural address put it this way:
There can be no equality or opportunity, the first essential of justice in
the body politic, if men and women and children be not shielded in
their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of great industrial
and social processes which they can not alter, control, or singly cope
with. 195
The history of Griggs sketched here is, finally, another episode in the
quest, begun in the Declaration and the Constitution, for a society in
which the blessings of liberty are shared by all.
192. See Expanding Affirmative Action, supra note 127.
193. Blumrosen, Rethinking the Civil Rights Agenda: Impressions of the Rutgers Law School
Conference, 37 RUTGERS L. REV./CIv. RTS. DEV. 1117 (1985).
194. See supra text accompanying note 10.
195. 50 CONG. REC. 3, 63d Cong., I Sess., Mar. 4, 1913.
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Source: EEOC Annual Reports; Ann. Rep., Director of Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 1977, 1983 and 1985.
1966-1972
1973-1977
1978-1983
1966-1983
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Charges
8,854
8,512
11,172
17,272
20,122
33,214
51,969
77,242
59,300
71,023
93,138
79,311
64,579
66,569
79,868
78,441
74,589
94,941
Settlements
Favoring
Complainants
111
306
424
486
324
1,373
726
2,279
4,500
5,993
7,378
8,127
14,225
17,823
27,232
30,849
26,996
29,075
